We don’t assume that an indirect mode of access to objects is incapable of disclosing the truth about things simply because its indirect. Indirect access is still access, and can’t testimony sometimes be accurate?
To encounter an object in any way is to translate that object, hence to transform it, hence to distort it; as a consequence, he claims, we are everywhere and always surrounded by fictions:
objects in the world [that] are submitted to rough translation by the human senses and human brain… all of the objects we experience are merely fictions
^London Review of Books, How complex is a lemon? Stephen Mulhall (on Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything by Graham Harman).
If an object in its truest form is is already simplified-translated-distorted-false-fictional by human understanding, then is a literal translation of an object (in an ulterior metalanguage or metaphysicality) a fictionalised fiction? Or a translation of a translation? At this point would the object in its truest form remain the object. Or would the metaphysical translation become the object in focus?
A fictionalised fiction takes form as a double negative, does this equate then to authenticity?